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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relation between in°ation, output and government size by reex-
amining the time inconsistency of optimal monetary and ¯scal policies in a general equilib-
rium model with staggered timing structure for the acquisition of nominal money µ a la Neiss
(1999), and public expenditure ¯nanced by means of a distortive tax. It focuses on how
macroeconomic institutions may a®ect output, in°ation and taxation when monetary and
¯scal policies strategically interact in presence of monopolistic distortions in labor markets.
It is shown that, with pre-determined wage setting, ¯scal and monetary policy are subject
to a time inconsistency problem, and the equilibrium rate of in°ation is above the Friedman
rule while the equilibrium tax rate is below the e±cient level. In particular, the discretionary
rate of in°ation is nonmonotonically related to the natural output, positively related to gov-
ernment size, and negatively related to conservatism. Finally, a regime with commitment is
always welfare improving over a regime with discretion.
1 Introduction
During the 1990s, many OECD countries had declining rates of in°ation while their unem-
ployment rates were also falling (see Figure 1). This is clearly in contrast with the negative
relationship between in°ation and unemployment predicted by a standard Phillips curve. More-
over, Figure 2 depicts a positive (average) relation between in°ation and government size in
the same period.1 Grilli et al., 1991 and Campillo and Miron, 1997, for instance, ¯nd also a
positive correlation between in°ation and the size of government in the major OECD countries.
This paper analyzes these macroeconomic outcomes in terms of time inconsistency in a game
theoretic model with three players: the central bank (CB), the ¯scal authority (FA) and wage
setters.
¤Address: EPFL, ODY 2 17 (Odyssea), Station 5, CH-1015 Lausanne (Switzerland), telephone: +41 21 693 00
68, e-mail: vincenzo.cuciniello@ep°.ch. The author is very grateful to Luisa Lambertini for advice and suggestions.
The usual disclaimer applies.
1Countries shown in Figure 1 and 2 have been chosen among the most industrialized OECD countries with













































−15 −10 −5 0
unemployment change (%)
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium 2005/1
1990−2000


































30 40 50 60 70
total receipts government (% GDP)
Source: OECD Statistical Compendium 2005/1
1990−2000
Figure 2: In°ation and total receipts government 1990-2000.
2Since the in°uential papers of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983),
several authors have addressed the issue of time inconsistency and the desire of policy makers
to raise output above its market-clearing level due to the existence of distortions. The optimal
monetary policy of low in°ation is not credible in the absence of binding commitments; and the
time consistent but suboptimal monetary policy leaves unemployment una®ected and generates
an excessively high rate of in°ation.
The bulk of this literature on the importance of dynamic inconsistency has focused on the
relationship between institutional aspects governing the CB and in°ation. For example, em-
pirical evidence suggests that appointing a conservative CB is important for reducing in°ation
(see e.g. Alesina, 1989; Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). Although this point has
been acknowledged in these works, the connection between macroeconomic institutions, such as
government size, and the problem of time consistency of monetary policy has not been modeled
explicitly in a fully microfounded model.2 These connections are particularly important because,
in most industrialized countries, monetary and ¯scal policies are set by two authorities which
are, in general, at least partially independent.
The paper builds on Neiss (1999), where a money-in-the-utility-function framework together
with staggered timing, provide a theoretical basis for a microfounded inclusion of in°ation as a
cost in the policymaker's objective function. Public expenditure enters in the utility function and
is ¯nanced by means of a distortive tax while labor markets are characterized by monopolistic
imperfections and nominal rigidities.3 In particular, there are three areas in which our model
provides insights into the relation between in°ation, output and macroeconomic institutions.
Firstly, the di®erent performance in terms of in°ation and unemployment shown in Figure
1 may be explained by monopolistic distortions in labor markets and the CB's incentive to
in°ate. A reduction of unemployment rate has two opposite e®ects on the equilibrium rate
of in°ation. On the one hand, it causes an increase of marginal costs of in°ating because of
lower leisure. However, as unemployment decreases and, as a consequence, output increases, the
demand for real money increases as well. This implies that, for a given rate of in°ation and tax,
the marginal cost of in°ating falls, because it is decreasing and convex in real balances. These
counterbalancing e®ects lead to a nonmonotonic relationship between the discretionary level of
in°ation and the rate of unemployment.
Secondly, the model shows that the discretionary level of in°ation is positively related to
the weight attached to public expenditure in the utility, i.e. the size of government spending
in the economy. In fact, an increase in government size enlarges the gap between e±cient and
natural output and raises real money demand. Both e®ects encourage the CB to overin°ate.
An increase in the degree of CB conservatism, instead, is found to have a negative impact on
the discretionary rate of in°ation.
2The role played by institutions in the creation of European unemployment has recently receive increasing
attention: see, for example, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Nickell et al. (2005).
3In most countries in the OECD, wage setting takes place through collective bargaining between employers
and trade unions at the plant, ¯rm, industry or aggregate level. There is some evidence that labor market
institutions, mainly labor union power in wage setting, has a considerable impact on unemployment(Nickell et
al., 2005).
3Finally, the strategic interaction between the policymakers is analyzed under a regime with
discretion or with commitment. The regime with commitment always improves welfare over the
discretionary regime. In fact, the level of natural output is equal in the two regimes while in°a-
tion is higher with discretion. Note that this result relies upon the possibility for policymakers
of a®ecting output. With binding commitments unexpected in°ation and/or taxation are ruled
out and both ¯scal and monetary policy are ine®ective on output. However, given that ¯scal
policy is endogenous, the level of tax distortion and, as a consequence, the level of public expen-
diture is not invariant to the regime change. Thus, a movement from a discretionary regime to a
regime with commitments yields a higher level of government spending because the government
does not have any incentive to set a lower tax in order to reduce the gap between the e±cient
and natural output.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 investigates
the benchmark cases of a benevolent social planner and fully °exible wage setting. Section
4 considers the strategic interaction between ¯scal and monetary policy in presence of pre-
determined wage setting under a regime with discretion and commitment; the e®ects of the
parameters of the economy on the in°ation bias and government spending. This is followed by
concluding remarks.
2 Economic Setup
The essential elements of the economy setup are taken from the general equilibrium model
developed in Neiss (1999). The structure of the model is a staggered timing for the acquisition
of nominal money within a money-in-the-utility-function framework. The novelty of the paper
is the introduction of real frictions via monopolistic competition in the factor markets and
distortive taxation on top of public spending entering in the utility function.
2.1 Firms
A pro¯t-maximizing competitive ¯rm produces a single consumption good using imperfectly
substitute labor types, Nt(j), as inputs with j 2 [0;1]. The ¯rm is price taker in both product
and labor markets.4 The production function exhibits decreasing return to scale and a constant




t ® > 1; (1)
where ® measures the returns to scale in production. Aggregate employment is assumed to be









¾ > 1; (2)
where ¾ measures the elasticity of input substitution.
4Di®erently from Neiss (1999) monopolistic competition is introduced in the input market instead of the
product one.
4For a given level of production, demands of each labor type j in period t solve the dual
problem of minimizing total cost,
R 1
0 Wt(j)Nt(j)dj, subject to the employment index (2), where
















The wage index has the property that the minimum cost of employing an array of labor types
Nt is given by WtNt. Finally, since Yt = N
1=®
t , the aggregate labor demand is achieved by
maximization of nominal pro¯ts,












where Pt is the price of the homogeneous good and ¿t is the proportional tax rate levied on sales
by the FA at time t.
2.2 Households
The economy is populated by a large representative family with a continuum of j 2 [0;1]
members which supply a di®erentiated labor type. The household's preferences are de¯ned over
per capita consumption, Ct, public spending, Gt, real money balances, Mt=Pt, and quantity of



















Parameter ½ 2 (0;1) measures the weight attached to public consumption relative to private
consumption, ¯ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, Â > 0 is the weight attached to the utility of real
balances and º > 1 controls the convexity of the in°ation cost.5
In maximizing (7) the household faces the following budget constraint
Bt+1 + Mt+1 + PtCt = Dt +
Z 1
0
Wt(j)Nt(j)dj + PtTt + Bt(1 + it) + Mt (8)
and labor demand (3), where Bt are bonds which pay the nominal net rate of interest it and
Tt are lump-sum transfers by the CB. We assume that B0 = 0; since all households are equal
5The condition º > 1 ensures that the monetary authority's choice problem is always a global maximum (see
Neiss, 1999)
5in equilibrium, there will be no trade in bonds (i.e. a zero net asset position). The ¯rst-order
conditions for the family are given by














where equation (9) is the standard consumption Euler equation linking present and future con-
sumption. The second equation (10) expresses the demand for real money at time t. Drawing
on Neiss (1999), Mt is predetermined in period t since money holdings are e®ectively chosen
in period t ¡ 1 and M0 > 0 is given. Such an assumption implies that an expansionary policy
raising the price level has an utility cost in terms of forgone real balances. We postpone the
remaining optimality conditions until we consider the union's problem.
2.3 The Fiscal Authority
Each period, the FA consumes Gt units of the homogeneous good. The FA levies a proportional
tax on sales, ¿, which is controlled in order to maximize the utility of the household (7). We
assume that government's budget is balanced in every period so that
¿tYt = Gt: (11)
2.4 The Central Bank



















which di®ers from (7) because of the parameter ÂB. The event of a benevolent monetary
authority occurs when ÂB = Â. Following Svensson (1999)'s terminology, the extreme case of
ÂB ! 1 is a strict in°ation targeting, whereas the case of a ¯nite ÂB is called °exible in°ation
targeting. A conservative CB (ÂB > Â) will attach a higher weight to real balance compared to
a benevolent one.
We assume that at time t the CB directly controls the next period money supply, Mt+1, and
rebates the seignorage through a lump-sum transfer, i.e.
Mt+1 ¡ Mt = PtTt: (13)
Since prices are °exible, when the CB sets money supply Mt+1 indirectly manages price level
Pt via the equilibrium in the money market (10). Thus, for sake of simplicity, we posit that the
CB maximizes (12) setting directly the current in°ation rate, denoted by ¼ = (Pt ¡Pt¡1)=Pt¡1,
and bearing in mind that Mt and Pt¡1 are given at time t.6
6The absence of a state variable in the model implies that the current money supply does not a®ect the
62.5 Unions
Workers are organized in a continuum of trade unions, each of which represents a set of the
family members specialized in a given labor service. Unions are benevolent and maximize the
utility function of their represented workers (7) by controlling at time t the wage Wt(j).
Maximization of (7) is subject to the labor demand schedule (3), the aggregate employment
index (2), and the household's budget constraint (8). In a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. when









where M ´ ¾=(¾ ¡ 1) > 1 is the mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and leisure. This expression states that the real wage is set so as to equate a
mark-up over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
3 Natural and E±cient Allocation under Flexible Wage Setting
In this section we derive the optimal level of output, consumption and government spending
and show how it can be supported in equilibrium when wage are fully °exible. This will prove a
useful benchmark for judging the role of di®erent macroeconomic institutions, to which we turn
later.
3.1 Fully Flexible Wages
Proposition 1 In an economy in which agents perceive utility from government spending and
wages are °exible, the output level is lower, the higher is the government size and the mark-up
set by unions.
Plugging the government's budget constraint (11) into the good-market clearing condition (24),
we can write the following relation between consumption and disposable income at time t
Ct = (1 ¡ ¿t)Yt: (15)
Substituting this expression into the unions' ¯rst order condition (14) yields














household's discounted utility starting from the next period. Hence, in a Markov equilibrium the monetary
authority faces the static problem of maximizing the current period's utility.
7As is common in this literature on wage setting (e.g. Lippi, 2003), unions take dividends as given. See
equation (49) for a derivation of such a result.
7It is apparent that ¯scal and monetary policy do not a®ect output in the case of °exible
wages; output remains at its market-clearing level (17), regardless of in°ation and tax choice. In
such a case maximization of (7) with respect to ¿ subject to (15) yields the following ¯rst-order














Now, dividing (15) by (11) and using the optimal condition (18), we obtain that the natural
level of private and public consumption are respectively
^ C = (1 ¡ ½)^ Y ; (20)
^ G = ½^ Y ; (21)
where clearly the FA sets ¿ = ½. In other words, the FA would like to equate the marginal
utility of consumption to the marginal utility of government spending. Condition (19) requires
to equate the (CB) marginal utility of real balances to the social marginal cost of producing














suggests that from the viewpoint of each individual the private marginal cost of holding real
balances at time t is not zero, and coincides with the opportunity cost of holding money it=(1+it).
Thus, the CB ¯rst-order condition requires that
it = 0 (23)
for all t, i.e. the optimal monetary prescription is the Friedman rule. The implication of (23)
for the equilibrium rate of in°ation is ¼ = ¯ ¡ 1 < 0.8
3.2 The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner maximizes the family utility (7) with respect to Ct, Gt and Mt=Pt subject
to the technological constraint (1) and the good market clearing condition
Yt = Ct + Gt: (24)
8This can be immediately derived from the Euler equation (9).
8The optimal allocation coincides with a sequence of static problems so that in any given period














The ¯rst relation states that the marginal loss of utility of the household of producing an
additional unit of good (given by ®Y
®(1+Á)¡1
t ) must be equal, at the margin, to the utility gain
originated by the two possible uses of that additional output: consumption and government
spending. The second relation requires the (social) marginal utility of real balances be equal to
the social marginal cost of producing real money balances, i.e. zero.
Using the good market clearing condition (24) and the ¯rst order conditions (25), we obtain
the optimal level of output, consumption, government spending and in°ation as follows:
~ Y = (1=®)
1
®(1+Á) (26)
~ C = (1 ¡ ½)~ Y (27)
~ G = ½~ Y (28)
¼ = ¯ ¡ 1 < 0: (29)
It is worth noticing that the main di®erence with the decentralized case in section (3.1) concerns
the equilibrium level of output.
Remark 1 The natural output level (17) is below the optimal output level (26).
The departure from the e±cient output level is due to two sources of ine±ciency. First, the
monopolistic power in the labor market implies that there be a wedge, M > 1, between real
wages and the marginal rate of substitution. This e®ect may be eliminated by assuming an
extreme labor market regime as perfect competition (¾ ! 1, M = 1). By contrast, production
subsidies, often seen as a remedy to labor market distortions (e.g Alesina and Tabellini, 1987;
Dixit and Lambertini, 2003), can not a®ect such distortions: wages are always set so that (16)
holds. Therefore the expectation of a subsidy would trigger a real wage increase that exactly
neutralizes the impact on natural output.
Second, trade unions neglect the e®ects of their actions on the public consumption which is
taken as given in the maximization problem. This explains why, even with M = 1, wages are
set above the optimal level by the factor 1 ¡ ½ (see equation (17)). A remedy to this situation
would be a highly centralized/coordinated bargaining systems, where wage negotiations involve
also the FA. In this case unions would take into account the macroeconomic constraints such
as the government's budget and internalize the consequences of wage claims on government
expenditure (e.g. Summers et al., 1993). However, for the remainder of the paper, we keep
assuming atomistic wage setting.
94 Strategic Interaction between Fiscal and Monetary Authori-
ties under Pre-determined Wages
Our model features two types of wage setting: fully °exible and and pre-determined wages. The
former was analyzed in section 3.1, where we noticed that both ¯scal and monetary policy could
not a®ect output given by equation (17). In°ation and tax rate were, hence, set according to
the Friedman rule and the optimal tax rate ½, respectively.
Here we assume that nominal wages are set before in°ation and tax rate are known. In such
a case there is scope for ¯scal and monetary policy to a®ect the output in the \short run".9
Moreover, assume that policy makers may or may not act in a coordinated way as in Alesina and
Tabellini (1987). In this respect, two possible alternative institutional regimes will be tackled:
a discretionary regime and a regime with binding commitments.
4.1 Discretionary Regime
In this regime we exclude any possibility of commitments by the policymakers. The three agents
(unions, CB and FA) act as Nash player, taking everybody's else current strategy as given.
Nominal wages are set equal to the level expected to produce the real wage that equates
labor supply (14) and labor demand (6) as follows10





t )^ Y 1¡®; (30)
where ^ Y , Pe
t and ¿e
t denote respectively the natural level of output (17) and the expected price











^ Y 1¡®; (31)
where ¼e
t ´ (Pe
t ¡ Pt¡1)=Pt¡1. Thus, from equations (6), (24) and (15), employment, consump-
tion and government spending are respectively given by
Nt =
·






^ Y ®; (32)
Ct =
·






(1 ¡ ¿t)^ Y ; (33)
Gt =
·






¿t^ Y : (34)
The game is static and is repeated only a ¯nite number of times. Therefore, the only subgame
perfect (and hence time-consistent) Nash equilibrium of the repeated game coincides with the
9In this model the short run coincides with the period in which wages can not be modi¯ed. When wages are
predetermined, the employment level is then determined only by the labor demand.
10This expression is achieved by combining equations (17) and (16).
10unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game. Assuming that the economy is at the Nash
equilibrium at time t ¡ 1, the nominal interest rate at time t is found by associating the Euler
equation (9) and the equilibrium level of consumption at time t ¡ 1 (i.e., ^ Y (1 ¡ ¿)). Thus,











Note that both a surprise in°ation and a tax cut cause the nominal as well as the real interest rate
to rise. Then, the solution to consumption, output, and nominal interest rate yields equilibrium
































Now, the one-shot Nash equilibrium can be computed as follows. The FA maximizes the
household's utility function (7) setting the tax rate at time t, ¿t, subject to the constraint (33),
(34), (32). In doing that the rate of in°ation and unions' expectations are taken as given. It is
convenient to rewrite the FA's ¯rst order condition as follows:11




t §N¿ | {z }
marginal benefit
= 0; (37)






§C¿ = §N¿ ´ ¡
®¿
(® ¡ 1)(1 ¡ ¿)




1 + ®(¿ ¡ 1)
(® ¡ 1)(¿ ¡ 1)
> 0: (38)
A higher tax rate has three e®ects on household's welfare. First, from equation (32), it is
clear that an unexpected tax rise triggers employment to decrease, thereby reducing the cost
of providing labor. Second, it lets the FA collect more tax revenue and thus boosting public
consumption.12 Finally, an increase in taxation leads to a reduction in private consumption and,
hence, in utility. This implies the FA has to equate the sum of marginal utilities originated from
larger public spending and leisure to the marginal disutility due to less private consumption.
Since the economy starts from a level of output below the e±cient one, the marginal utility
of an additional unit of consumption is larger than the marginal disutility of producing it. Thus,
the FA has an incentive to set a lower tax rate. However, in such a process the FA undergoes a
reduction in marginal utility stemming from less resources available for public spending, which
in part discourages tax cuts. To see that, we may solve the ¯rst order condition (37) for ¿, so





1¡¿ which is clearly solved for ¿ = ½.
12In order to have a positive elasticity between government revenue and tax rate, i.e. to be on the e±cient
side of the La®er curve, the condition ¿ <
®¡1















~ Y ®(1+Á) ¡ ^ Y ®(1+Á)
i: (39)
Clearly as long as natural output is below the optimal employment level the FA will choose a
tax rate lower than the socially e±cient one, ½ (see section 3).

















The CB maximizes the utility (12) selecting the in°ation rate at time t, ¼t, under the constraints
(33), (34), (32) and (40). Fiscal stance as well as unions' expectations are taken as given. The
solution of the CB's problem yields, in a rational expectation equilibrium (i.e. when ¿e = ¿ and
















The CB's ¯rst-order condition (41) implies that it is optimal for the CB deviates from the
Friedman rule (19). The monetary authority, in fact, has an incentive to raise prices up to the
point where the sum of marginal bene¯ts due to more public and private consumption equate
the sum of marginal costs due to less leisure and real balances:14




t §N¼ | {z }
marginal cost
= 0; (42)
where §C¼, §G¼, §N¼ and §m¼ are the elasticity of consumption, government spending, em-
ployment and real money (m ´ M=P) to in°ation rate ¼ de¯ned as follows:
§C¼ = §G¼ ´
¼
(1 + ¼)(® ¡ 1)
> 0; §N¼ ´
¼®
(1 + ¼)(® ¡ 1)




In order to compute the equilibrium rate of in°ation and public consumption, we use the
¯rst-order conditions of the two policymakers, together with the real money demand (22) and
government's budget constraint (11):




















13Where the superscript d stands for discretion.






which is clearly solved by conforming with the Friedman rule ¼t = ¯ ¡ 1.
12Gd = ¿d^ Y : (45)
In equilibrium output and government spending are below their e±cient levels (~ Y and ½~ Y )
while in°ation is above the Friedman's rule (¯ ¡ 1). The discretionary in°ation rate is actually
formed by two components. The ¯rst one is Friedman's rule and the second is the in°ation bias.
It is apparent from (44) that when output is at its e±cient level , the Friedman's rule holds,
i.e. in°ation rate is set so as to equate the negative of the real interest rate. The presence of
monopolistic power in the labor market and externality lead output to be below the e±cient
level (see section 3.1). For a given tax rate, this creates an incentive for the CB to in°ate when
wages are sticky. Similarly, the FA is induced to boost the economy by setting a tax rate below
the e±cient level ½.
These results are in line with Alesina and Tabellini (1987). Nevertheless, they ¯nd that, in
absence of government spending in the objective functions of the policymakers, in°ation and
output are at their target levels. This is due to the fact that the FA subsidizes ¯rms so as to
eliminate the distortion in the labor market. By contrast, in our model, if public expenditure
does not enter in the utility function of households (i.e. when ½ = 0) in°ation and output are
still di®erent from their e±cient values.
The reason is that in equilibrium unions set their real wage as a constant mark-up over the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure (see equation (14)). An increase
in taxation has a twofold impact on labor. First, it leads a reduction in consumption and, hence,
in real wages, whereby the demand of labor increases. Second, it directly reduces the demand of
labor by dampening sales revenue. The two e®ects exactly o®set each other so that the natural
level of output turns out to be policy invariant. When ½ is equal to zero, the distortion in wage
setting related to the externality on the FA's budget is trivially eliminated, but there is still a
mark-up over the real competitive wage.15 Therefore, since output is below the e±cient level,
the CB has an incentive to deviate from the Friedman's rule.
Proposition 2 In a Nash game between the two policy makers: i) an increase in ÂB reduces
in°ation without any repercussions on output; ii) an increase in ½ reduces output and raises
in°ation.
The intuition behind this proposition comes from the e®ect of ÂB on the CB incentive to create
unexpected in°ation. Since a more conservative CB (a larger ÂB) undergoes higher costs by
lowering real balances, this thwart a reduction of real money balances to a larger extent. In
fact, the marginal cost of in°ation, through its e®ect on real balances, is decreasing and convex
in real balances. In consequence of that in°ation will be lower in equilibrium the higher is ÂB.
Moreover, this result implies that, given the natural level of output, society would be made
better o® by having appointed a CB more averse to in°ation than society itself.16
As to the government size, the negative impact on output is due to the fact that wage setters
do not take the brunt of their wage choice on public consumption. Wages hence re°ect such an
ine±ciency and are positively related to the government size parameter ½ (see equation (16)).
15See section 3.1 for further details.










Figure 3: Discretionary in°ation and natural output
The positive relationship between government size and in°ation is due to two e®ects. First, if
agents attributes a higher weight to public expenditure, this enlarges the gap between e±cient
and natural output. This stimulates the CB to in°ate because of lower leisure cost. Second, the
overall impact of an increase in ½ on money demand is positive. This is due to the fact that a
higher ½ reduces the marginal utility of consumption, i.e. it has the same impact of increase in
consumption. Hence, the CB undergoes a reduction in the marginal cost of in°ation through
the increase in real money balances.
From equation (44) we may derive an hump-shaped relationship between in°ation rate and
natural level of output as shown in Figure 3.17 An increase in the size of ^ Y has two opposite
e®ects on the equilibrium rate of in°ation. First, it causes an increase of marginal costs of
in°ating because of the leisure e®ect. When ^ Y is relatively high, the marginal cost of in°ating
are high: equation (41) points out that the monetary authority's incentive to systematically
overin°ate is low because of the \small" discrepancy between e±cient and natural output. Such
e®ect dominates when ^ Y is relatively high. Second, as ^ Y increases, the market-clearing level of
output rises and, for a given rate of in°ation and tax, the equilibrium demand for real balances
rises as well. Hence, the marginal cost of in°ating falls, since it is decreasing and convex in real
balances. Such an e®ect dominates for relatively low level of output.
When the level of output ^ Y is relatively close to the e±cient one ~ Y , the curve in Figure
3 seems at odds with the Phillips curve relationship between in°ation and unemployment .
However, during the 1990s, many OECD countries had declining rates of in°ation while their
unemployment rates were also falling. The analysis so far may hence give a justi¯cation for such
seemingly contradictory developments.
4.2 Regime with Binding Commitments
In this regime we assume that both CB and FA enter in a binding commitment before nominal
wages are set. In other words, the CB and FA act simultaneously as Stackelberg leader with
17Parameter values used to draw the ¯gure are the following: ½ = 0:5; º = 4; ¾ = 6; ® = 0:65
¡1; Â =
0:015; Á = 0:5; ¯ = 0:99; ÂB = 0:02. These values yield a level of ^ Y = 0:57, M = 1:2, ¿ = 0:24 and ¼ = 2:62
percent.
14respect to the workers. Drawing on Alesina and Tabellini (1987), we compute the equilibrium
with commitment simply by imposing the requirement that ¼ = ¼e and ¿ = ¿e before taking
the CB and FA ¯rst-order conditions, rather than subsequently as in section 4.1. In such a way
the CB and FA anticipate that in equilibrium unexpected in°ation and taxes are ruled out.
From equations (33), (34) and (32), it is apparent that the CB may only a®ect the real
balances by setting the in°ation rate. As analyzed in section 3.1, the CB obeys the Friedman
rule when it can not a®ect output:18
¼c = ¯ ¡ 1: (46)
The FA, instead, equates the marginal utility of consumption to the marginal utility of public
expenditure, as in the case of °exible wage setting. The optimal tax rate and level of public
expenditure are hence given by:
¿c = ½ (47)
Gc = ½^ Y : (48)
Comparing the equilibrium in°ation and government spending under a discretionary regime
(equations (44), (39) and (45)) and under binding commitment regime (equations (46), (47) and
(48)), we may establish the following proposition.
Proposition 3 ¼c < ¼d; ¿c > ¿d; Gc > Gd:
This result shows that commitments are always better than discretion. In fact, in the regime
with commitments the in°ation rate is lower than in the case of discretion. Hence, in terms
of real balances agents are better o®. Moreover, since under commitments the marginal utility
of consumption and government spending are equal, the overall impact on welfare of switching
regime from discretion to commitment is positive.
5 Concluding remarks
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) note that changes in unemployment over time and between coun-
tries can only be explained by an interplay of shocks and di®erences in labor institutions. This
paper makes a ¯rst step towards integration of disparate pieces of analysis on wage setters,
monetary and ¯scal policy.
In a microfounded general equilibrium model we have analyzed how macroeconomic institu-
tions may a®ect output, in°ation and taxation when monetary and ¯scal policies strategically
interact in presence of monopolistic distortions in the labor markets. A main message from the
paper is that, with pre-determined wage setting, ¯scal and monetary policy are subject to a
time inconsistency problem. As a result, in the absence of a commitment on the part of CB and
FA, the equilibrium rate of in°ation is above the Friedman rule and the equilibrium tax rate
below the e±cient level. In fact, labor market distortions lead output to be below the optimal
level, and both policymakers attempt an expansionary policy in order to reduce such a gap.
18The superscript c stands for commitment equilibrium.
15The main determinants of the size of the in°ation bias are the degree of monopoly power of
unions, the share of government spending in national income, and the degree of CB conservatism.
An important ¯nding of this analysis is that the discretionary rate of in°ation is nonmonotoni-
cally related to the natural output, positively related to government size, and negatively related
to conservatism.
An other set of results concerns the consequences of switching from a regime with discretion to
a regime with commitment. The regime with commitment is shown to be welfare improving over
the discretionary regime. The move from a discretionary regime to a regime with commitments
yields a higher level of government spending and taxation, and an equilibrium rate of in°ation
equal to the Friedman rule.
This paper can be fruitfully extended by incorporating public expenditures ¯nanced also
by means of money creation controlled by the CB. This would generate an other channel of
interaction between ¯scal and monetary policy as for example in Alesina and Tabellini (1987).
Appendix
Proof of optimal setting of wage j. To derive the j-th union ¯rst-order condition with
respect to the wage Wt(j), it is convenient to reproduce the Lagrangian relevant to this purpose









































where the conditional labor demand (3) has been plugged in. The ¯rst-order condition with












































(1 ¡ ¾) = 0;
where in the last equation we drop the j index because of symmetry between workers in equi-
librium.
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